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The Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act in the Age of Globalization: The Need 
to Amend the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (FTAIA) & Vigorously Apply 
International Comity 
SAMUEL F. KAVA*©  
Some may think it is an interesting hobby, others may call it a waste of money, but 
the best term to describe my passion for collecting athletic sneakers is to simply say 
I am a “sneaker-head.” Since I was 14-years-old I began collecting various Nike 
athletic shoes, specifically Jordan’s and Air Force 1’s. While my passion for collecting 
athletic shoes has been unrelenting, the method of my purchases has changed 
drastically over the past 10-years. Rather than going to my local brick-and-mortar, 
the majority of my purchases are now executed via the internet. E-commerce 
platforms have depleted my territorial limitations and have allowed me to diversify 
my sneaker collection. In addition, these e-commerce platforms have made me a 
more educated consumer. Because these platforms are easily accessible and provide 
transparent pricing, I can price shop and attempt to get my favorite sneakers at the 
lowest cost.  
While there are many benefits to e-commerce, and the benefits certainly 
outweigh the costs, it is necessary to discuss the costs to ensure laws are in place to 
protect consumers, producers, and distributors alike. Thus, one of the biggest 
concerns with the paradigm presented above is: which nation’s laws will apply in 
the event of dispute? The supply chain may include a Chinese manufacturer that 
makes the shoe, a German seller that designs the shoe under its brand, an Indian e-
commerce company that connects the German seller with various buyers, and a U.S. 
consumer.  
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This paper examines the complexities of choice of law, in this new age of 
globalization, through the lens of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Sherman Act was 
enacted by Congress in 1890 to: (1) ensure economic competition, (2) provide new 
businesses a shot at entry, and (3) prevent companies from extracting supra-
competitive profits. Initially, the Act was limited to conduct occurring in the United 
States; however, in lieu of globalization, courts began a gradual process of 
expanding the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to any 
situation that had an effect on U.S. commerce. Today, despite Congress’ attempt to 
limit the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to only conduct 
that has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in 
the United States,” there are hardly any mechanisms to limit the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Specifically, the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) has become obsolete in the current age of 
globalization, the Supreme Court does not take international comity seriously, and 
there may be another expansion of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Act with the Supreme Court’s recent finding in Apple v. Pepper that consumers have 
standing to bring anti-trust claims against Consumer-to-Consumer (“C2C”) e-
commerce platforms.  
This broad application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act has led many foreign 
nations to enact blocking statutes. Between the breadth of the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act and the conflicting foreign blocking statutes, the 
choice of law uncertainty has been exacerbated and will certainly have adverse 
economic effects on all stakeholders involved in the supply chain. Thus, this paper 
further prescribes courses of action for all three branches of the United States 
government to ensure e-commerce continues to excel and provide benefits for its 
consumers, producers, and e-commerce platforms.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 1890, using its Constitutional power “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States,”1 the United States Congress passed the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act.2 The Sherman Act, which is considered “the most important and 
frequently enforced competition law of the United States,” was enacted to “curb 
concentrations of power that interfere with trade and reduce economic 
competition.”3 According to Lina M. Khan, a legal scholar at Columbia Law School, 
Congressional intent to promote competition was not just for the benefit of 
consumers but a means of “prevent[ing] large firms from extracting wealth from 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 2. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). 
 3. Donald E. Knebel, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Principles and Responses, 8(2) 
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 181, 182 (Sept. 14, 2017). Sherman Antitrust Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/event/Sherman-Antitrust-Act (last visited August 19, 2019). 
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[both] producers and consumers in the form of monopoly profits.”4 In addition, by 
ensuring competition, Congress hoped “new businesses and entrepreneurs [would 
have] a fair shot at entry.”5 While the goals of the Sherman Act are clear, through a 
review of legislative history, “nothing in the Sherman Act or its legislative history 
sheds light on whether the Act was intended or expected to be enforceable against 
persons who committed the prohibited acts outside the territory of the United 
States.”6 
Initially, courts across the United States were skeptical that the Sherman Act was 
to be applied extraterritorially—generally opting to apply U.S. law only when 
transactions took place solely within its territory.7 However, after World War II 
courts began to expand the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to 
conduct that had an anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce.8 While this expansive 
application of the Sherman Act has its origins in case law, Congress went on to 
codify the court’s view of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act with the passage of the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (“FTAIA”).9 The FTAIA was an express act 
of Congress that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was to be applied extraterritorially to 
any conduct that had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on 
commerce in the United States.”10 However, in an increasingly globalized market 
nearly all transactions have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect 
on commerce in the United States.”11 Thus, because the test for determining the 
scope of the Sherman Act has become toothless in the age of globalization, this 
paper advocates for a more comprehensive analysis that respects international 
comity. Specifically, this paper focuses on the adverse effects and potential 
retaliatory response of the international community if the Sherman Act goes 
through another iteration of expansion by permitting consumers standing against 
Consumer-to-Consumer (“C2C”) e-commerce platforms that merely “connect 
buyers and multiple sellers online.”12  
 
 4. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 740 (2017). 
 5. Id. at 741.  
 6. Knebel, supra note 3, at 183.  
 7. Id. See also Russell J. Weintraub, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry 
into the Utility of a Choice-of-Law Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1807 (1992).  
 8. Knebel supra note 3, at 190. See also Peter Vanham, A Brief History of Globalization, World Economic 
Forum (Jan. 17, 2019), http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/how-globalization-4-0-fits-into-the-history-
of-globalization/. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Adam Levy, The 7 Largest E-Commerce Companies in the World, (Dec. 26, 2018) (explaining that a “C2C 
e-commerce business [i.e. eBay] create[s] a marketplace to connect buyers and multiple sellers online…[it] 
merely facilitate[s] e-commerce through their platform.” This compares to the traditional Business-to-
Consumer (“B2C”) e-commerce platform where “a business sells a good or service [directly] to an individual 
consumer. . .[i.e.] Walmart.), http://www.fool.com/investing/2018/12/26/the-7-largest-e-commerce-
companies-in-the-world.aspx. 
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E-commerce, which “refers to commercial transactions conducted online,” 
connects local consumers with producers around the world.13 Some of the most 
successful e-commerce platforms include companies like: Amazon, Wal-Mart, 
Alibaba, JD.com, Shopify, eBay, and Rakuten.14 Because of the expansive reach of 
e-commerce platforms, consumers are no longer limited to their local brick-and-
mortar shops. As a result, e-commerce has become an integral part of consumer 
life because it provides consumers with a convenient way to shop, enhances 
consumer experience, and enables access to higher quality goods.15 By 2022, it is 
projected that e-commerce revenue will exceed $638 billion in the U.S. alone.16 
While e-commerce has given consumers more purchasing options, and 
corporations access to a larger market, the “direct, substantial, and foreseeable 
effects” of trading through e-commerce platforms will certainly lead to an increase 
in Sherman Anti-Trust Act litigation against e-commerce companies that are 
incorporated and operated outside the United States.17 Not only will these foreign 
corporations have a heightened fear of being criminally prosecuted, by an 
aggressive United States Department of Justice, but these foreign corporations may 
be subject to private consumer claims based on the recently decided United States 
Supreme Court case Apple v. Pepper.18  
Since 1914, when Congress enacted a complimentary statute to the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, known as the Clayton Act, consumer’s had standing to bring private 
anti-trust claims so long as they were “direct-purchasers” of the alleged anti-trust 
violator.19 While the direct purchaser rule has become well-developed by the 
courts, and would apply to traditional e-commerce platforms that use a Business-
to-Consumer (“B2C”) model, the Supreme Court was only recently given the 
opportunity to apply the direct purchaser rule to situations where a U.S. consumer 
wanted to sue an online e-commerce platform that utilized a C2C platform.20 In 
Apple v. Pepper, the Supreme Court determined whether a U.S. consumer had 
standing to bring a private anti-trust claim against a U.S. distributor who delivered 
 
 13. What is eCommerce?, ECOMMERCE GUIDE, http://ecommerceguide.com/guides/what-is-ecommerce/ 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2019).  
 14. Mayank Pratap, The World’s Five Largest eCommerce Companies, (Jan. 31, 2019), 
http://hackernoon.com/the-worlds-five-largest-ecommerce-companies-8dd94dc22614. See also Levy, supra 
note 12. 
 15. Consumers are Changing E-Commerce Preferences, MATERIAL HANDLING & LOGISTICS (Sept. 13, 2018), 
http://www.mhlnews.com/technology-automation/consumers-are-changing-e-commerce-preferences.  
 16. Kaleigh Moore, Ecommerce 101 + The History of Online Shopping: What the Past Says About 
Tomorrow’s Retail Challenges, BIG COMMERCE: ECOMMERCE NEWS, 
http://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/ecommerce (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).  
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
 18. Knebel, supra note 3, at 182. See also Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).  
 19. 15 U.S.C. §15 (a) (1914). See also infra Part IVa.  
 20. Levy, supra note 12.  
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a good where prices were set by a third party.21 The Court held that  consumers 
who purchased apps for their iPhones through Apple’s App Store had standing to 
sue Apple, a “Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C)” e-commerce platform, because the 
consumer was a “direct-purchaser” from Apple.22 With this Supreme Court decision 
there will undoubtedly be an increase in litigation against C2C platforms.23 
Specifically, regarding the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
there will likely be a windfall of litigation against C2C e-commerce companies that 
are incorporated and operated outside the United States because: (1) the Clayton 
Act would expand “direct purchaser standing” to consumers against C2C e-
commerce platforms, and (2) there are no mechanisms to minimize the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against e-commerce 
companies that are incorporated and operate outside the U.S.24  
Part I of this paper chronicles the Supreme Court’s changing view regarding the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; the Act’s current 
extraterritorial application; and the international community’s retaliatory response 
to the Act’s expansive use. Part II explains the main arguments that were heard by 
the lower courts in Apple v. Pepper. Part III provides background to the direct 
purchaser rule, which was established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Hanover Shoe v. 
United Shoe Machinery Co., and Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc.25 In addition, Part III 
discusses the narrow exceptions to the direct purchaser rule.26 Part IV analyzes the 
adverse economic and political effects of applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
extraterritorially, and the need to expand the international comity exceptions as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apple v. Pepper. The paper concludes by 
prescribing courses of action for all three branches of the United States government 
to ensure e-commerce continues to excel and provide benefits for its consumers, 
producers, and e-commerce platforms alike.  
I. INTERPRETING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN 
ANTI-TRUST ACT 
It is unlikely that the 51st Congress, which enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, had 
anticipated the Act to apply extraterritorially. However, in the age of globalization 
 
 21. Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 22. Id. See also Levy, supra note 12.  
 23. Daniel T. Fenske & Gabriel K. Gillett, Justice Department Urges Supreme Court to Resolve Scope of 
Illinois Brick in Case with Major Implications for Tech Industry, Jenner & Block LLP, 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/18077/original/Antitrust%20Alert%20-
%20Apple%20v.%20Pepper.pdf?1527707234 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). See also Andreas Rivera, What is 
C2C?, (July 20, 2018) (discussing the growth of C2C online platforms), 
http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/5084-what-is-c2c.html. 
 24. Levy, supra note 12.  
 25. Infra Part IVa. 
 26. Infra Part IVb.  
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it has become increasingly important to reconcile if the Sherman Act will apply to 
foreign entities engaged in commerce with consumers both in the United States 
and internationally. Over the past century—with vast improvements in technology, 
transportation, and the execution of multilateral treaties—the United States has 
seen an exponential growth in international trade.27 On a macro-level, with an 
export industry valued at $1.547 trillion US dollars in 2017, the United States is the 
second largest export economy in the world.28 On the other side of the balance 
sheet, the United States sits as the largest import economy in the world with $2.408 
trillion U.S. dollars of goods coming into the U.S. in 2017.29 While the sale of goods 
and services via e-commerce platforms only accounted for 6.5% of the U.S. 
economy in 2016; from 2006 to 2016 “the digital economy grew at an average 
annual rate of 5.6%, outpacing overall U.S. economic growth of 1.5% per year.”30  
It is unclear how much of this growth occurred as a result of the emergence of 
C2C e-commerce platforms; however, it is clear that the affluence of the U.S. 
position in the import-export industry is a growing product of individual consumers. 
LED TVs, greeting cards, plastic disposable gloves, cotton t-shirts, sneakers, cordless 
drills, Christmas lights, leather handbags, are some of the many products that have 
originated in foreign territories and made its way to American consumers through 
the chain of distribution or manufacture.31 Thus, with the growth of e-commerce 
and the deterioration of territorial boundaries, it has become increasingly pervasive 
to settle the issue of which nation’s laws should apply in the event of a trade 
dispute. Specifically, should U.S. anti-trust law be applied in a situation where a U.S. 
citizen purchased a product from an Indian producer on a C2C platform that is 
incorporated and operated in China? To help answer this question it is imperative 
to understand the history of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. Part I.A discusses the limited extraterritorial application that consumed 
the courts throughout the early parts of the 20th Century. Part I.B describes the 
case led expansion of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
Part I.C explains Congress’ attempt to limit the overly expansive extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act with the enactment of the FTAIA. Part I.D 
 
 27. Bennett O’Brien, Four Major Ways International Trade Has Changed Over the Past One Hundred Years, 
TRADE READY (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.tradeready.ca/2015/trade-takeaways/four-ways-international-trade-
changed-one-hundred-years/.  
 28. Top 20 Export Countries Worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264623/leading-export-countries-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).  
 29. Leading Import Countries Worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/268184/leading-import-countries-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 30. Initial Estimates Show Digital Economy Accounted for 6.5 Percent of GDP in 2016, NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/initial-estimates-
show-digital-economy-accounted-65-percent-gdp-2016 (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).  
 31. David Yanofsky, Explore All $506 Billion in Goods that the U.S. Imported from China in 2017, QUARTZ 
(Mar. 22, 2018), http://qz.com/1232833/explore-all-506-billion-in-goods-that-the-us-imported-from-china-in-
2017/.  
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provides the current extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
which disregards international comity and is not limited by the FTAIA. 
 A.  Territorial Limits of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: American Banana Co.  
The expansive extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is a fairly 
recent phenomenon. Initially, the Supreme Court was skeptical to apply the 
Sherman Act extraterritorially. The Court tended to uphold the “longstanding 
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”32 Essentially, because Congress did not explicitly express that the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act should apply extraterritorially, the Court presumed that the U.S. law 
“could not be construed to reach conduct outside the territorial limits of the United 
States.33 The idea that a nation’s laws are “supreme within a jurisdiction but 
generally powerless outside it” is referred to as the territorial principle.34 The 
seminal case that limited the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit.35 In this case, an Alabama corporation sued a 
New Jersey corporation for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.36 The plaintiff 
claimed that the New Jersey corporation “with [the] intent to prevent competition 
and to control and monopolize the banana trade, bought the property and business 
of several of its previous competitors” located in Panama and Costa Rica.37 Despite 
both plaintiff and defendant being incorporated within the United States, the 
Supreme Court held that because the alleged unlawful actions took place “outside 
of the jurisdiction of the United States . . . they [are not] governed by the act of 
Congress.”38 
B.   Expansion of the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act & 
International Comity 
By the end of World War II, courts across the United States began “a gradual process 
of reversing the holding of [American Banana] and expanding the reach of U.S. anti-
 
 32. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010) (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991)).  
 33. Knebel, supra note 3, at 185. See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) 
(explaining “the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done”) 
 34. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2448, 2455 (1999) 
(explaining that the territorial principle was widely accepted by the courts throughout the early parts of the 
20th Century, and received the endorsement of the coveted legal scholar Joseph Beale).  
 35. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 354.  
 38. Id. at 355.  
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trust laws.”39 Through a broad interpretation of Congressional power “to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations,” and largely through judicial policy-making, courts 
began to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the 
Sherman Act only applies within the territory of the United States by asserting 
either: (1) Congress intended the application of U.S. law to a particular set of facts, 
or (2) the particular fact pattern is not extraterritorial in the first place so that the 
presumption is inapplicable.40  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), established the modern-day test for plaintiffs 
to overcome the presumption of limited extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act.41 In Alcoa, the United States Department of Justice brought a 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act claim against a United States aluminum company for 
“monopolizing interstate and foreign commerce, particularly in the manufacture 
and sale of [its] aluminum.”42 The United States Department of Justice claimed that 
the aluminum company monopolized the market through its exclusive contracts 
with international distributors. Despite the transgressions occurring outside of the 
United States, the Court permitted the United States Department of Justice to 
pursue claims under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.43 The Court explained “any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct 
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”44 Thus, 
because the Court found that enough evidence was present to show the aluminum 
companies actions affected the trade and the commerce of the United States, the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act applied regardless of the location of the transaction and 
residence of the parties.45 More succinctly stated by the Southern District Court of 
New York over 20 years after the Alcoa decision, “[t]he antitrust laws of this country 
extend to any activity (unless plainly and clearly exempted by statute), whether 
carried on by a foreigner or a citizen, which affects the trade and the commerce of 
the United States.”46  
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Second Circuit’s expansive 
extraterritorially application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, in Hartford Fire 
 
 39. Knebel, supra note 3, at 186.  
 40. Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and 
the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 658 (2011)(explaining 
that proving what Congress wants is a “thankless (and probably fruitless) endeavor; thus, most plaintiffs today 
attack the presumption against extraterritoriality by asserting facts that show “the ‘focus’ of the substantive 
law in question is something that took place in the United States”). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 41. Knebel, supra note 3, at 187.  
 42. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945).  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 443. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Lmtd., 285 F.Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  
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Insurance Co. v. California.47 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co., a British Insurance 
company was sued under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by 19 states in the United 
States for “engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing other primary insurers 
to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability 
insurance policies.”48 The Supreme Court found that the facts of the case were 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of territorial application of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, and that “this Court has repeatedly upheld [Congressional] power to 
make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries 
where United States interests are affected.”49 However, the Supreme Court went a 
step further and acknowledged that “a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act 
jurisdiction over foreign conduct…by the employment of comity analysis.”50 Comity 
refers to “the respect nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their 
laws.”51 Section 403 of Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States provides a list of factors that a court may consider when deciding 
whether to apply U.S. law or respect a foreign nations laws.52 The factors are 
coveted to be “neutral criteria” that assist court’s in deciding “the law of the state 
whose interest is clearly greater.”53 Some of these factors were outlined in Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and include:  
[T]he extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the 
regulating state]…the connections, such as nationality, residence, or 
economic activity, between the regulating state and the person 
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated…the character of 
the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, 
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted…the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity…and the likelihood of conflict with the regulation 
by another state.54  
As expected, since Justice Scalia’s opinion came as a dissent, the Supreme Court 
did not find that international comity barred the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act in Hartford. The majority opined that “[t]he fact that conduct is lawful 
in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United 
 
 47. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  
 48. Id. at 764.  
 49. Id. at 813-14.  
 50. Id. at 798.  
 51. Knebel, supra note 3, at 198 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 817).  
 52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987).  
 53. Weintraub, supra note 7, at 1802.  
 54. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 818-19. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987). 
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States antitrust laws, even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or 
encourage such conduct.”55 Instead, the majority held that in order to bar the 
application of the Sherman Act against persons subject to the laws of a non-U.S. 
authority, the non-U.S. law must require the action being challenged so that 
“compliance with the laws of other countries is…impossible.”56 In other words, the 
Supreme Court limited the defense of international comity to only scenarios where 
it would be impossible to comply with both U.S. and the foreign nation’s laws. 
Making the international comity analysis even more obscure, in lieu of the Supreme 
Court’s Hartford decision, is the fact that “many nations share our faith in the value 
of competition, and as of 2017, over 130 jurisdictions have enacted antitrust laws 
as a means to ensure open and free markets, promote consumer welfare, and 
prevent conduct that impedes competition.”57 Thus, it is unlikely that foreign 
nations have laws that directly conflict with the United States law to the extent 
where it would be impossible to comply with both nations’ laws.  
While not expressed in Hartford, because the majority deemed international 
comity was unfounded given the alleged facts, the Supreme Court has explained 
that when evaluating international comity, courts shall not evaluate the legitimacy 
of the foreign nation’s law and accept the validity of it under the “act of state 
doctrine.”58 According the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez: 
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgement on the acts of the government of another, done within its 
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be 
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign power 
as between themselves.59 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hartford is significant for two 
reasons. First, the ruling affirmed and expanded the extraterritorial application of 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to situations where United States interests are affected. 
Second, the holding narrowed a defendant’s ability to claim that international 
comity should apply as a bar to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. Specifically, the Supreme Court limited the international comity defense 
to only situations where the laws of the United States and the foreign nation’s laws 
are in such conflict that adhering to one law would per se make you violate the 
other law. 
 
 55. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799.  
 56. Knebel, supra note 3, at 198–99 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799). 
 57. Knebel, supra note 3, at 202.  
 58. Id. at 199–200.  
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C.   Blocking Statutes & The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) 
The broad application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the narrow exception to 
barring the Act through international comity, led many foreign nations to enact 
blocking statutes to “protect their nationals from criminal [and civil] proceedings in 
[the United States] where the claims to jurisdiction by those courts [were] excessive 
and constitute[d] an invasion of sovereignty.”60 Many of the United States’ closest 
allies—the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, South Africa, the 
Netherlands—enacted blocking statutes that:  
[T]riggered the issuing of conflicting injunctions, [] given rise to a spate 
of foreign statutes designed to thwart discovery in the United States 
proceedings…[and] the most extreme example of outrage at the 
extraterritorial application of our anti-trust law is the United Kingdom’s 
‘Clawback Act.’ This statute goes far beyond simply denying recognition 
to the United States decrees and permits suits in the United Kingdom to 
recover any part of the judgement already paid that exceeds 
compensatory damages.61  
In addition, even U.S. companies opposed the broad application of the Act 
because they felt it “handicapped [them] in competing for off-shore business 
against foreign firms that were not subject to the strict antitrust constraints 
imposed by U.S. law.”62 
To quell the concerns of both foreign nations and domestic companies, the 
United States Congress enacted the FTAIA. The FTAIA, which went into effect in 
1982, provided protection for export transactions by “imposing additional 
requirements for establishing a Sherman Act claim involving foreign commerce that 
is not import trade or import commerce.”63 Specifically, in order to bring an anti-
trust claim, the FTAIA required “the conduct to have a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in the United States.”64 In other words, 
a foreign exporter would not be subject to prosecution under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act if it engaged in an anticompetitive act (i.e. price fixing) that did not “have 
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce in the United 
States.”65 As is apparent by the FTAIA statute, corporations that are engaged in 
import commerce are “unaffected by the FTAIA and remain[] subject to the 
 
 60. Id. at 192 (citing Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 1 A11 E.R. 434, 459 (H.L. 1978)).  
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 62. Knebel, supra note 3, at 193 (citing Abbott Lipsky & Kory Wilmot, The Foreign Trade Improvements Act: 
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Sherman Act.”66 Nevertheless, the FTAIA was a good faith effort by the legislative 
branch to: (1) improve the nation’s international relations, (2) ensure U.S. domestic 
companies were not disadvantaged, and (3) provide “a unified legal standard to 
determine whether the U.S. antitrust law applies to foreign transactions.”67  
D.   FTAIA’s Failure to Withstand Time & International Comity Is Not Taken 
Seriously 
The FTAIA temporarily eased the concerns of both the international community and 
U.S. based exporters; however, the legislation failed in terms of unifying the 
standard to determine whether U.S. anti-trust law applies to foreign transactions. 
The clause “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable,” has become a product 
of “judicial interpretation…[which] has created significant circuit splits.”68 
Specifically, the word “direct” has been construed differently among the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits.69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has interpreted the term 
‘direct’ to require that the effect on U.S. commerce follow as an ‘immediate 
consequence’ of the defendant’s conduct.”70 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has 
broadly “construed the term ‘direct’…to denote a ‘reasonably proximate causal 
nexus.’”71 Nevertheless, as the global economy becomes more integrated the split 
in the way courts define “direct” has become irrelevant.  
Most trades that take place today have a direct impact that is both: (1) of 
immediate consequence, and (2) the reasonable proximate causal nexus. Especially 
with C2C e-commerce platforms, which serve to create “liquidity” in the market by 
connecting sellers with many buyers, it is foreseeable that this platform will 
proximately cause a multi-national transaction that causes an immediate 
consequence to a U.S. producer.72 For example, if Alibaba were selling adidas 
sneakers on its platform, at an anti-competitive price, Nike would be instantly 
harmed because a customer (whether a U.S. or foreign citizen) will buy the cheaper 
and similar product on the platform rather than purchase through Nike. This harm 
is of immediate consequence to the Nike’s of the world, and Alibaba certainly is 
 
 66. Knebel, supra note 3, at 196.  
 67. Lauren Giudice, What Effects Are “Direct” Enough to Satisfy the FTAIA: An Analysis of 2014 FTAIA 
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able to foresee it being the proximate causal nexus to this harm. Thus, the FTAIA 
has become an obsolete and toothless statute in the age of globalization. 
The United States Department of Justice has exemplified the ease of proving a 
transaction has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on 
commerce in the United States.”73 The success of the Justice Department has led to 
its aggressive pursuit of criminal anti-trust claims against foreign companies 
operating outside the United States.74 Since 1999, “about 90 percent of fines of $10 
million for criminal violations of U.S. antitrust laws [] have been levied against non-
U.S. defendants for conduct occurring outside the U.S. Twenty-eight percent of 
those fines have been in excess of $100 million, with the largest, a fine of $650 
million, levied in 2017.”75  
Moreover, with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apple v. Pepper, C2C e-commerce 
companies that are incorporated and operated outside the U.S. will undoubtedly 
be exposed to higher levels of private claims under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
These foreign e-commerce companies would be subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act under two theories, either the e-commerce company may be: (1) defined as a 
company engaged in import commerce, in which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
automatically applies and FTAIA is irrelevant; or (2) viewed as a company engaged 
in conduct that will have a “direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on commerce 
in the United States.”76 Regardless, with both the FTAIA becoming obsolete and the 
Supreme Court’s potential expansion of standing for consumers to sue C2C e-
commerce platforms as “direct purchasers,” litigation against foreign e-commerce 
corporations will proliferate to the demise of the global economy.77  
While the international community has been slow to enact up-to-date and 
effective blocking statutes, there will certainly be a resurgence by foreign nations 
to adopt statutes that would limit the scope of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. For one, 
with globalization making the FTAIA affectively obsolete, the international 
community will strive to pressure the United States to adopt a new unified standard 
that expressly respects international comity. Second, advances in technology, like 
C2C e-commerce, will exacerbate the likelihood that the international community 
will: (1) adopt new and effective blocking statutes, and (2) pressure Congress to 
amend the current FTAIA to be more restrictive in its extraterritorial application. 
Specifically, with Supreme Court’s decision in Apple v. Pepper, the international 
community will look for ways to protect its e-commerce platforms from litigious 
activity brought in the United States under U.S. anti-trust law.  
 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF APPLE V. PEPPER 
One of the most important value-adds to the iPhone, which occurred a year after 
the release of the product, was the access iPhone users got to Apple’s “App Store.”78 
The App Store is “an internet site where iPhone users can find, purchase, and 
download iPhone apps.”79 The applications offered in the App Store are intended 
to enhance the iPhone user experience by offering applications that provide 
entertainment, financial assistance, food and drink recommendations, health and 
fitness directives, and more.80 When the App Store opened, on July 10, 2008, five-
hundred applications were available to its users.81  Some of the apps released were 
developed in-house by Apple employees; however, the majority of the apps were 
developed by third-party developers.82 Initially, 25 percent of the apps available in 
the App Store were offered to iPhone users for free.83 Of the remaining 75 percent 
of apps, 90 percent were sold at a modest fee of $9.99 or less.84  
In order to gain access to iPhone users, via the App Store, third-party app 
developers had to pay Apple “a commission on each third-party app purchased for 
use on an iPhone.”85 The arrangement between Apple and the third-party 
developer worked akin to royalty payments: “[w]hen a customer purchase[d] a 
third-party iPhone app, the payment [wa]s submitted to the App Store. Of that 
payment, 30% [went] to Apple and 70% [went] to the developer.”86 In addition to 
charging third-party developers in exchange for access to its platform, Apple placed 
stringent user agreements on both third-party developers and iPhone customers. 
To control the content in the App Store, Apple “prohibit[ed] app developers from 
selling iPhone apps through channels other than the App Store, threatening to cut 
off sales by any developer who violate[d] this prohibition.”87 Similarly, Apple 
discouraged iPhone users from downloading apps from unapproved platforms and 
“threaten[ed] to void iPhone warranties if they d[id] so.”88 Apple’s control over 
third-party app developers and iPhone users led Stephen Schwartz, Edward Hayter, 
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Eric Terrell, and Robert Pepper (“Plaintiffs”) to file an antitrust lawsuit against 
Apple. 
The Plaintiffs asserted two claims against Apple: (1) unlawful monopolization of 
an aftermarket for iPhone applications in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
and (2) attempted monopolization of the same aftermarket.89 The aftermarket 
refers to the selling of apps to iPhone users, which the “Plaintiffs contend that Apple 
ha[d] instituted…’an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize the aftermarket for 
iPhone applications in order to control and derive supracompetitive profits from 
the distribution of iPhone apps worldwide.’”90 The Plaintiffs complaint centered 
around the 30 percent commission that Apple received from the sale of third-party 
developer’s apps.91 The Plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the “supracompetitive 
30% fee” developers set a price that offset its high royalty fee, which subsequently 
harmed the consumer since they were forced to pay an inflated price for the app.92 
Compounding the issue, the Plaintiffs asserted that Apple had controlled its 
monopoly and ensured its profits by prohibiting consumers from shopping for Apps 
on other sites outside the App Store in fear of voiding their warranty.93 According 
to the Plaintiffs complaint, “Apple ha[d] ‘cornered 100% of the distribution market 
for iPhone applications’ and effectively ‘foreclosed iPhone customers from buying 
software from any source other than Apple.’”94 As a result of Apple’s system, the 
“Plaintiffs summarily conclude[d] that they have been injured by Apple’s conduct 
because they paid more for their iPhone apps than they would have paid in a 
competitive market.”95  
On December 2, 2013, after hearing the case at hand, the United States District 
Court of the Northern District of California granted Apple’s Motion to Dismiss on 
the grounds that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an antitrust claim.96 
Specifically, the Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act.97 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which will be covered in greater 
detail in Part IV, requires the claimant in an antitrust claim to be “the first party in 
the chain of distribution to purchase a price-fixed product.”98 Hence, “indirect 
purchasers are precluded from suing based on unlawful overcharges passed on to 
them by intermediaries in the distribution chain who purchased directly from the 
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alleged antitrust violator.”99 While the United States District Court of the Northern 
District of California acknowledged three, potentially four, exceptions that would 
give an indirect purchaser standing in an antitrust violation; the court found that 
“none of the exceptions applied to the Plaintiffs and the 30 percent figure for which 
Plaintiffs complain is not a fixed fee, but a cost passed-on to consumers by 
independent developers. As such, any injury to Plaintiffs is an indirect effect 
resulting from the software developers’ own costs.”100 The Plaintiffs appealed the 
United States District Court of the Northern District of California’s ruling on the 
grounds that the Court “erred in characterizing them as indirect purchasers from 
Apple, and therefore without statutory standing.”101 
On January 12, 2017, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back to the United States District 
Court of the Northern District of California to be heard on its merits.102 The United 
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed Section 4 of the Clayton Act using the 
same criteria set forth by the lower court, and acknowledged that “the general rule 
is that only ‘the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of 
manufacture or distribution,’ has standing to sue.”103 However, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals used most of the opinion distinguishing whether Apple is a 
manufacturer or producer, or whether it is a distributor. The Court explained that if 
Apple is determined to be a manufacturer or producer, then the Plaintiffs would be 
considered indirect purchasers.104 Conversely, if Apple is determined to be a 
distributor from whom Plaintiffs purchased directly, Plaintiffs would have standing 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to bring the antitrust claim against Apple.105 
Under this framework, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Apple was a 
distributor of the iPhone apps, selling the apps with a thirty percent markup directly 
to purchasers through its App Store.106 The Court reversed and remanded the case 
back to the district court because it found that Plaintiffs were direct purchasers of 
iPhone apps from Apple and had standing to sue under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  
Apple filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on August 2, 2017.107 In its petition for writ of certiorari, Apple asked 
the Court to answer the question of “whether consumers may sue anyone who 
delivers goods to them for antitrust damages, even when they seek damages based 
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on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged 
offense.”108 The Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2018, and heard the case on 
November 26, 2018.    
III. SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: DIRECT PURCHASER RULE & ITS 
NARROW EXCEPTIONS 
Whether a consumer has standing to bring an antitrust claim depends on if a court 
classifies a consumer as a direct-purchaser from the alleged malfeasant. With few 
exceptions, the Supreme Court has strictly adhered to a narrow interpretation of 
the “direct purchaser rule.” Section III.A provides background to the direct 
purchaser rule, which was established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Hanover Shoe v. 
United Shoe Machinery Co., and Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc. Section III.B provides 
a caveat to the direct purchaser rule, and articulates the narrow exceptions 
recognized by the Supreme Court.   
 A.  The Direct Purchaser Rule  
The crux of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring an antitrust lawsuit centers 
around the Courts interpretation of Section 4 of the Clayton Action, which states: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district 
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides 
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.109 
The language adopted by Congress is broad and appears to provide standing to 
“any person,” regardless of their position in the chain of distribution, so long as 
some injury occurred because of an antitrust violation.110 However, over time, “the 
Supreme Court has limited those who may sue for antitrust damages…[to] only ‘the 
overcharged direct purchasers, and not others in the chain of manufacture or 
distribution.’”111 This rule has come to be known as the direct purchaser rule.112   
The first case where the Court limited standing to only direct purchasers was 
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery.113 In Hanover Shoe, Hanover Shoe, the 
plaintiff, sued United Shoe Machinery for charging supracompetitive rates in 
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violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for the lease of its manufacturing 
equipment. United Shoe Machinery claimed that Hanover Shoe had no standing 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act because it passed on its manufacturing costs to 
its customers and did not bear the cost of the injury.114 Essentially, United Shoe 
Machinery claimed that the only party harmed by its high leasing costs were the 
customers of Hanover Shoe, who were forced to pay inflated costs for shoes 
because Hanover Shoe passed the burden of its manufacturing costs by setting a 
higher price on its goods. The court rejected United Shoe Machinery’s “defensive 
use of pass-on theory” and held that because Hanover Shoe was a “direct purchaser 
from the machine manufacturer they were injured by the full amount of the 
overcharge irrespective of who ultimately bears the cost of that injury.”115  
The Court rejected the defensive use of pass-on theory for two reasons. First, 
the Court held that it is “virtually unascertainable” to prove that an intermediary 
had passed on the costs of an overcharge to its customers.116 According to the 
Supreme Court there are “[a] wide range of factors that influence a company’s 
pricing policies…[and] a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact 
been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more 
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a 
different price.”117 Second, the Court rejected the defensive use of pass-on theory 
because, had it permitted the defense to United Shoe Machinery, it would be nearly 
impossible for the customer to “meet the challenge that [the manufacturer] passed 
on the higher price to customers.”118  
Practically speaking, these difficulties will likely cause customers not to proceed 
in litigation because they would only have “a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest 
in attempting a class action.”119 Thus, “those who violate the antitrust laws…would 
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring 
suit against them.”120 As a result, Hanover Shoe was permitted to proceed on the 
merits of its case against United Shoe Machinery because it was a direct purchaser 
of the company and a prima facie case of an antitrust violation was asserted by the 
plaintiff.121  
Nine-years after Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court developed the direct 
purchaser rule in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois by rejecting an attempt of a plaintiff to 
use the “pass-on theory offensively.”122 The State of Illinois, in its capacity as a 
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purchaser of a building, initiated a lawsuit against a group of companies that 
manufactured and distributed concrete bricks. The concrete brick companies, who 
were allegedly engaged in a price fixing scheme, sold concrete bricks to a masonry 
contractor. The masonry company then installed and built a masonry structure for 
a general contractor, who then sold the entire building to the State of Illinois. The 
State claimed that they overpaid $3 million for the building as a result of the price 
fixing conspiracy between the concrete brick companies.123 Essentially, the State 
asserted that the overcharge of the brick companies was passed on by the masonry 
contractor, to the general contractors, and now to the State. Thus, the State wanted 
to hold the first party in the chain of distribution liable for its antitrust violation 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.124  
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected the State’s attempt to 
“offensively use the pass-on theory,” and dismissed the antitrust claim on the 
grounds that the State lacked standing as a direct purchaser of the concrete 
bricks.125 The Court provided three policy reasons for its holding. First, “the 
reasoning of Hanover Shoe cannot justify unequal treatment of plaintiffs and 
defendants with respect to the permissibility of pass-on arguments.”126 Essentially, 
the Court held that “evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved in the 
defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive 
use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant in the chain 
of distribution.”127 The more rigorous review, associated with the offensive use of 
pass-on theory, would “clog the courts with  protracted and expensive litigation.”128 
Second, “allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious 
risk of multiple liability for defendants.”129 By permitting an indirect purchaser 
standing, via the offensive use of pass-on theory, the indirect purchaser would be 
permitted to sue each party in the chain of distribution for the amount 
overcharged.130 The multiplicity of lawsuits would “increase[] the possibility of 
inconsistent adjudications.”131 Third, allowing indirect purchasers to piecemeal its 
damages against multiple defendants (in this case the masonry contractor, general 
contractor, and the brick companies) would “reduce the effectiveness of antitrust 
laws by diluting the share of damages better-suited direct purchasers might secure 
by bringing suit.”132  
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The last Supreme Court case that sets the foundation of what is now known as 
the direct purchaser rule is Kansas v. UtiliCorp. United, Inc.133 In UtiliCorp, customers 
of a public utilities company initiated an antitrust lawsuit against a group of natural 
gas producers for price fixing. The customers attempted to offensively use the pass-
on theory by stating the natural gas producers “conspired to inflate the price of 
their gas.”134 The chain of distribution started with the gas producers selling gas to 
the public utilities company, and then the public utilities company would distribute 
the gas to the customers at the inflated price. A similar lawsuit, claiming antitrust 
violations of the natural gas producers, was filed by the public utilities company 
against the natural gas producers.135  
The customers conceded that they were direct purchasers of the public utilities 
company and only indirect purchasers of the gas producers; however, they urged 
the Court to allow for an exception to the direct purchaser rule and permit indirect 
purchaser suits in cases involving regulated public utilities that “pass on 100 percent 
of its costs to their customers.”136 The crux of the customers argument, to provide 
an exception to the “direct-purchaser rule,” was that “[the] concerns in Hanover 
Shoe and Illinois Brick about the difficulties of apportionment, the risk of multiple 
recovery, and the diminution of incentives for private antitrust enforcement would 
not exist in such cases.”137 Despite these compelling reasons for the Supreme Court 
to disregard the “direct-purchaser rule,” the Court remained steadfast to its narrow 
interpretation of the rule because it would be “inconsistent with precedent and 
imprudent….to create an exception for regulated public utilities.”138 The Supreme 
Court explained that while “the rationales of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick may 
not apply with equal force in all instances, ample justifications exist for the Court’s 
stated decision not to carve out exceptions to the indirect purchaser rule for 
particular types of markets.”139 The Court dismissed the customers lawsuits, and 
affirmed that the direct purchaser—the public utilities company—was best situated 
to initiate suit.  
 B.   Exceptions to The Direct Purchaser Rule  
Despite the Supreme Court’s strict application of the direct purchaser rule, the 
Court in Illinois Brick acknowledged that there may be two narrow exceptions 
where an indirect purchaser would be permitted standing under Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act to bring an antitrust claim. First, an indirect purchaser may have 
standing when a pre-existing cost-plus contract between the direct purchaser and 
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indirect purchaser exists.140 The Court rationalized that an indirect purchaser should 
have standing in this situation because “preexisting cost-plus contracts…make it 
easy to prove that the direct purchaser has not been damaged” and the overcharge 
was clearly allocated to the indirect purchaser.141 Thus, the complexities that lead 
to protracted and expensive litigation do not exist when a cost-plus contract is 
present.142 Second, an indirect purchaser may have standing when the price fixer 
owns or controls the direct purchaser.143 In this situation, “there is no realistic 
possibility that the direct purchaser will file suit…and concerns with apportionment 
and double recovery are inapplicable.”144 Nevertheless, these scenarios did not 
present themselves in Illinois Brick and the State’s claims were dismissed because 
they were indirect purchasers without standing. Likewise, these situations did not 
apply in Apple v. Pepper.145  
IV. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE NEED FOR A MORE ROBUST 
INTERNATIONAL COMITY ANALYSIS AND EFFECTIVE BI-LATERAL 
TREATIES 
After the Supreme Court hearing in Apple v. Pepper, which took place on November 
26, 2018, many practitioners and legal scholars anticipated that the Supreme Court 
would hold that consumers have standing to bring Sherman Anti-Trust Act claims 
against C2C e-commerce platforms that merely connect sellers with buyers. The so-
called “liberal bloc”—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—all “gave 
varying indications that they are inclined to find for the plaintiffs.”146 Justice Breyer, 
who appeared to simplify the chain of distribution or manufacture, implied that 
“iPhone users buy apps directly from Apple, the alleged monopolist, and direct 
buyers can always sue the alleged monopolist for an overcharge, even under Illinois 
Brick.”147 However, even more compelling that the Supreme Court would find in 
favor of consumer standing is the fact that Justices Gorsuch and Alito “both 
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expressed a belief that Illinois Brick was either wrongly decided or no longer 
relevant in the modern economy.”148  
The pundits’ predictions were correct, and in a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice 
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court held that consumers who purchased apps for their 
iPhones through Apple’s App Store were direct purchasers from Apple under the 
Illinois Brick standard.149 The logic of the Court was simple:  
[T]he iPhone owners are not consumers at the bottom of a vertical 
distribution chain who are attempting to sue manufacturers at the top 
of the chain. There is no intermediary in the distribution chain between 
Apple and the consumer. The iPhone owners purchase apps directly 
from the retailer Apple, who is the alleged antitrust violator. The iPhone 
owners pay the alleged antitrust violator. [Thus,] the absence of an 
intermediary is dispositive…[and] the iPhone owners are direct 
purchasers from Apple.150   
With this holding, consumers would presumably be able to hail C2C e-commerce 
companies, which are incorporated and operated outside the United States, into 
the United States for any alleged Sherman Anti-Trust Act violation. Thus, this 
decision may exacerbate the already aggrieved international community, lead to 
the enactment of more burdensome blocking statutes, and slow down the growth 
of the emerging C2C e-commerce platforms. In lieu of these economic threats, the 
current extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act needs to be 
revised to limit its overly broad application. While the FTAIA was a good faith effort 
by Congress—to improve diplomatic relations, ensure U.S. domestic companies 
were not disadvantaged, and provide “a unified legal standard to determine 
whether the U.S. antitrust law applies to foreign transactions”—it has become 
obsolete in the age of globalization.151  
Part V.A analyzes the adverse economic effects caused by the overly broad 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In addition, Part IV.A 
provides a Congressional remedy to combat the looming prospect that foreign 
nations may be compelled to adopt more stringent blocking statutes because of the 
Supreme Court decision in Apple v. Pepper. Part IV.B explains the importance of 
expanding the international comity analysis in order to effectively remedy the 
pitfalls of the FTAIA. Particularly, Part IV.B advocates that more factors should be 
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used by courts when deciding whether to apply U.S. law or respect a foreign nations 
law. Part IV.C concludes by acknowledging that bi-lateral treaties have assisted the 
United States in enforcing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against foreign companies; 
however, greater cooperation and more detailed treaties could help facilitate even 
more support for the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.  
 A.   Adverse Political and Economic Effects  
Before the FTAIA was enacted, in 1982, many of the United States’ closest allies 
were disgruntled by the U.S. courts’ expansive extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.152 These nations confided in the territorial principle, and 
believed it “axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to 
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack.”153 The United Kingdom, one 
of the most outspoken allies against the United States’ “attempt[] to impose [its] 
domestic laws on persons and corporations who are not U.S. nationals and who are 
acting outside the territory of the United States,” viewed the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as ironic given the fact “the United States 
was founded by those who took exception to little matters of taxation being 
imposed extraterritorially.”154 Thus, in an attempt to “protect their nationals from 
criminal [and civil] proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction 
[were] excessive and constitute[d] an invasion of sovereignty,” foreign nations 
enacted blocking statutes to resist the extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Act.155  
The blocking statutes of each nation varied, but all served to “block the discovery 
of documents located in their countries and bar the enforcement of foreign 
judgements.”156 The United Kingdom achieved these goals with the Protection of 
Trading Interests Act, France with the French Blocking Law, Canada with the Foreign 
Extraterritorial Measures Act, and Australia with the Foreign Proceedings Act.157 
The conflicting laws between the United States and its foreign counterparts created 
tremendous uncertainty regarding what nation’s laws would be applied in the event 
of a cross-border dispute. According to Nuno Limáo and Giovanni Maggi, 
economists from the University of Maryland and Yale University, “as the world 
becomes more integrated, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty 
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should tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing the 
levels of trade barriers.”158  
Essentially, for trade to prosper, it is more important to provide producers and 
consumers with predictability and certainty (regarding the rule of law) rather than 
enacting laws that focus on free trade economics. Accordingly, it is in the best 
interest of governments to focus on unifying its laws before negotiating for the 
elimination of tariffs or quotas. This is not to say that eliminating trade barriers is 
not vital to the health of the economy—in fact, tariffs, quotas, and other trade 
barriers are proven to adversely affect all parties involved in the chain of 
distribution—however, it is more important to unify laws before focusing on the 
elimination of any trade barriers.159 
 As mentioned in Part I.C., the complaints of U.S. exporters and foreign 
governments were heard, and the United States Congress enacted the FTAIA “to 
address the concerns of foreign governments that the effects test established in the 
Alcoa case had not made clear the magnitude of the U.S. effects required to support 
a claim under the Sherman Act.”160 Thus, the FTAIA was implemented to bring 
certainty to consumers and producers by requiring that “conduct must have a 
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’” for the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act to apply extraterritorially.161 This language provided the foreign community 
with temporary relief, and gave producers and consumers the certainty and 
predictability needed to establish confidence in the markets and continue trading.   
However, since the passage of the FTAIA in 1982, the world has witnessed a 
remarkable increase in globalization, such that most conduct that takes place today 
has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” 162 on the U.S. 
economy. Epitomizing the obscureness of the FTAIA, is the fact that U.S. 
enforcement agencies—i.e. the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission—have taken an aggressive approach to pursuing international anti-
trust claims. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) published the International Guidelines—a publication 
“explaining how the agencies intend to enforce U.S. antitrust laws against conduct 
occurring outside the United States.”163 The International Guidelines have taken the 
broadest approach in determining if conduct is “direct”—finding if there is a 
“reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and the effect” conduct 
is “direct”—and the narrowest view that international comity bars enforcement of 
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U.S. antitrust laws only when it is impossible for the actor to comply with both U.S. 
law and its foreign nation’s law.164 Thus, because the FTAIA has become ineffective 
and there is a risk of further expansion of the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act with Apple v. Pepper, foreign nations will almost certainly 
strive to adopt modern and effective blocking statutes. These blocking statutes will 
revitalize uncertainty in the markets, and the global economy will be adversely 
affected.  
In addition, because our world is more integrated, compared to the time when 
the FTAIA was implemented, the adverse economic effects may be worse if foreign 
nations pursue modern blocking statutes. To hedge against judicial uncertainty, 
corporations will likely react by hiring more robust legal teams. By re-allocating 
money to legal costs, with the hopes of avoiding potential litigation and ensuring 
compliance with all nations’ laws, corporations would have foregone the 
opportunity to spend time and money on: (1) scaling its current line of products 
(which would decrease the price of goods for consumers),  (2) enhancing the 
capabilities of its current line of products (which improve consumer capabilities and 
increase corporate profits), or (3) creating new  and innovative products (which 
would benefit both consumers and producers). Thus, because corporations would 
be forced to spend more resources on avoiding litigation rather than research and 
development with the new blocking statutes, consumers, producers, distributors, 
and the economy as a whole will be adversely affected.  
Overall, there is a significant risk that foreign nations will look towards blocking 
statutes to limit the extraterritorial application of the Act. The conflicting laws of 
the United States and international community will lead to judicial uncertainty, 
which will have an adverse impact on the global economy. Businesses will spend 
more time and money to avoid disputes; thus, undermining corporate profits, a 
customer’s ability to purchase low cost goods, and the overall health of the global 
economy. The only certainty is that trade will slow down as a result of trade policy 
uncertainty. To avoid these adverse economic effects, it would be advantageous for 
the United States Congress to amend the FTAIA in a way that limits the effects of 
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Specifically, Congress 
should limit the effects of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act by expressly providing courts with a robust international comity analysis.   
 B.   International Comity Test  
As was discussed in Part I.B., comity refers to “the respect nations afford each other 
by limiting the reach of their laws.”165 Prior to the Supreme Court case Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co., which narrowed the comity analysis to only situations where it would 
be impossible for a foreign entity to comply with both U.S. and foreign nation’s laws, 
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federal courts considered a host of factors to determine if the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act was barred from applying extraterritorially. Section 403 of Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides eight factors a court 
should consider when deciding whether “a state may [or may] not exercise 
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections 
with another state.”166 These eight factors include: (1) the link of the activity to the 
territory of the regulating state; (2) the connection between the regulating state 
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated; (3) the 
character, importance, extent, and degree of importance of the regulation to the 
regulating state; (4) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected 
or hurt by the regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system; (6) the extent to which the regulation is 
consistent with the traditions of the international system; (7) the extent to which 
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (8) the likelihood 
of conflict with regulation by another state.167 
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., highlighted 
many of these factors and determined that international comity barred the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act’s extraterritorial application in that case.168 However, the 
majority decided to narrow the comity analysis by only considering if “the non-U.S. 
law must require the action being challenged so that ‘compliance with the laws of 
both countries is…impossible.’”169 This narrow comity analysis has led to the 
broadening of the Sherman Anti-Trust Acts extraterritorial application, which 
jeopardizes the economic well-being of the global economy. While some courts 
have disregarded the Supreme Court’s narrow comity analysis, by claiming that the 
Supreme Court “left unclear whether it was saying that the only relevant comity 
factor in that case was conflict with foreign law…or whether the Court was more 
broadly rejecting balancing of comity interests in any case where there is no true 
conflict,” Congress should expressly provide federal courts with a broad range of 
factors it should consider to ensure the United States respects the laws of other 
nations.170 Specifically, Congress should amend the FTAIA by explicitly providing 
that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act only applies extraterritorially in cases where it does 
not offend the sovereignty of a foreign nation.  
In essence, to ensure the economic prosperity of the global economy, the United 
States Congress should be proactive in amending the FTAIA. Specifically, Congress 
should prescribe a broad international comity test for courts to consider when 
deciding if the Sherman Anti-Trust Act should apply extraterritorially. If 
international comity is taken seriously, unlike its most recent application by the 
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Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., there will be a greater degree of 
compliance by the international community and more certainty will be provided to 
consumers and producers. Moreover, federal courts should not wait until Congress 
amends the FTAIA. In fact, federal courts should, on its own accord, extensively 
apply an international comity analysis to every case where a foreign entity is 
involved. As was previously mentioned, some courts continue to apply a robust 
international comity analysis. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Mujica v. Airscan Inc. considered:  
[T]he location of the conduct in question, the nationality of the parties, the 
character of the conduct in question, the foreign policy interests of the United 
States, any public policy interests, the strength of the foreign governments’ 
interests, and the adequacy of the alternative forum.171 
Thus, until the United States Congress takes the necessary step to amend the 
FTAIA, federal courts should consider applying an international comity analysis to 
all cases that involve an international entity. By adopting a broad international 
comity analysis: (1) foreign nations would be less likely to adopt burdensome 
blocking statutes, (2) consumers and producers would have more certainty through 
unified laws, (3) the global economy will continue to prosper because of the 
certainty and predictability of the law, and (4) foreign nations may become more 
amenable to enter into bi-lateral treaties with the United States.  
 C. Bi-Lateral Treaties  
While beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the United States 
has attempted to use bi-lateral agreements to enhance international cooperation 
with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1982, the 
United States and Australia signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Antitrust 
Matters “to minimize jurisdictional conflicts.”172 In 1991, “the United States and the 
EU reached an antitrust cooperation agreement that commits the parties to notify 
each other of imminent enforcement action, to share relevant information, and 
consult on potential policy changes.”173 In addition, “similar arrangements have 
been made between the United States and Canada.”174 Nevertheless, the provisions 
of these agreements provide that “U.S. courts are not a proper institution to 
balance interests of concerned countries within the context of private antitrust 
litigation…[and may require] the Government of the United States to participate in 
the litigation.”175 Given what was asserted in this paper, these bi-lateral treaties 
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have had little effect in: (1) limiting the extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, and (2) gaining international cooperation.  
However, if the United States Congress amends the FTAIA to ensure a broad 
international comity analysis is applied and/or the federal courts begin to take 
international comity more seriously, the international community may become 
more amenable to accepting the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. The Executive Branch would have the opportunity to negotiate bi-lateral 
treaties that advocate for unified laws. The President of the United States, using the 
presidential power granted under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, could “propose and 
chiefly negotiate agreements” that provide certainty regarding what nations laws 
will apply if a cross-border dispute were to arise. Thus, the President of the United 
States should attempt to negotiate bi-lateral treaties that advocate for unified laws 
with the intent of: (1) providing certainty and predictability to consumers and 
producers, and (2) achieving international support on the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. After negotiating these bi-lateral 
agreements, the President of the United States should fast track the proposal for 
Congressional approval to avoid “regular legislative procedures…[that] can be time 
consuming.”176  
CONCLUSION: BI-LATERAL TREATIES AND NEW COMITY OF NATIONS TEST 
Overall, technological advances have enabled the exponential growth of the global 
economy. While producers and consumers have largely benefited from 
globalization, the contradictory laws between trading nations has created judicial 
uncertainty that may lead to adverse economic effects. The United States’ 
aggressive pursuit of applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act extraterritorially has led 
many foreign nations to adopt blocking statutes. These blocking statutes, while they 
were dormant for a period of time after the FTAIA was enacted, will have a 
resurgence following the further depletion of territorial boundaries with 
globalization. Specifically, because all conduct today has a “direct, substantial, and 
foreseeable impact on U.S. commerce,” the FTAIA does not limit the extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act. Furthermore, in lieu of the Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co. case, courts have narrowed the ability of defendants to bar the extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. anti-trust laws to only situations where compliance with U.S. 
law and foreign law would be impossible.  
The Sherman Act is likely to expand its extraterritorial reach, yet again, based on 
the outcome of the Apple v. Pepper case.177 To avoid an economic lull, all three 
branches of the United States government need to work diligently to find solutions 
that provide: (1) consumers and producers with certainty and predictability as to 
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the law that will be applied with cross-border transactions, (2) foreign nations with 
confidence that the federal courts within the United States will respect the 
sovereignty of its nation, and (3) its citizens with assurance that they will not be 
victims of large corporations seeking supra-competitive profits.  To achieve these 
goals, the United States Congress must amend the FTAIA to include a 
comprehensive international comity test that requires courts to balance the 
interests of all stakeholders. The federal courts of the United States, on its own 
accord, should begin to take the international comity analysis more seriously and 
apply it rigorously in all cases that involve cross-border transactions. Last, the 
President of the United States, in an effort to gain international support and avoid 
a resurrection of blocking statutes, needs to negotiate bi-lateral treaties that are 
more detailed and provide mechanisms for the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.  
